A Contribution to the Understanding of Right by Mandudzo, Dennis T.

THE ZIMBABWE LAW REVIEW
1995 VOLUME 12
CONTENTS
ARTICLES
A Contribution to the Understanding of R ight................................................................. 1
Dennis T. M andudzo
The Concept of Separation of Powers in Zimbabwe: Constitutional Myth or 
Reality?....................................................................................................................................... 10
i W elshman Ncube
Access to Water: Right or Privilege?..................................................................................26
-  J ennifer Mohamed-Katerere
Compulsory Acquisition of Land in Zim babwe................................ ;.......................... 50
\ Ben Hlatshwayo
Legal History in Law: A Zimbabwean Perspective....................................................... 65
, Welshman Ncube
Equality as Justice or Justice as Fairness? Kantianism and Socio-Economic
Rights............................................................................................................................................ 78
Dennis T. M andudzo
Insolvency and the Corporate Debtor: Some Legal Aspects of Creditors'
■ doghts Under Corporate Insolvency in Zimbabwe..........................................................85
- Lovemore Madhuku
The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Look at International Law Uses for Other
States............................................................................................................................................. 93
W ebster N. Chinamora
Voodoo Law Brewed in the African Pot?: Judicial Reconstruction of the
Customary Law of Inheritance in Zimbabwe................................................................. 101
W elshman Ncube
The Right to Strike in Zimbabwe........................................................................................113
Lovemore Madhuku ,
. Sentencing First Offenders in Botswana...........................................................................125
Kholisani Solo
The Editors of the Zimbabwe Law Review welcome the submission of articles, book 
reviews and case notes for consideration by the Editors for possible inclusion in the 
Law Review.
All articles must comply with the following:
• The article submitted must be an original article that has not been published 
elsewhere. The Editors may, however, consider republication of an article that 
has already been published elsewhere if the written authorisation of the other 
publisher is provided. If it has been or will be submitted for publication elsewhere, 
this must be clearly stated.
• The article must be clearly typed, single spaced and on one side of uniform sized 
paper. Whenever the article has been typed on a word processor, the author should 
endeavour to submit a copy of the article on the three and a half inch computer 
disk, indicating the word processing software package used. A print out of the 
article must, however, accompany the computer disk.
• Footnotes should be used instead of endnotes and the footnotes should be 
numbered consecutively.
• Titles of books and journal articles should be referred to in this manner:
Tembo C., The Control o f Governments by the People (People's Press, Harare, 1981).
Moyo B., Workers Rights and Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (Progress 
Press, 1994) p 34.
Chauvinist M., "Domestic Violence and Male Wimps" (1991) 4 Family Law 21.
Redstar X., "An Exegesis on the Ideology of Ideologies in Law" 1994 Zimbabwe 
Law Review Vol. 11.
NOTE: The abbreviated reference for the Zimbabwe Law Review is Zim L Rev. This 
abbreviation is used in order to distinguish the Review from the abbreviated title for 
the Zimbabwe Law Reports, namely ZLR.
v CONTRIBUTIONS
Z imbabwe Law R eview 1
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF RIGHT
Dennis T. Mandudzo
Lecturer, Department of Private Law, University of Zimbabwe
INTRODUCTION
The foremost issue that confronts contemporary legal jurisprudence is that of rights and 
yet paradoxically, modern legal discourse has failed to grasp the normative essence of 
right. This essay is concerned with one fundamental inquiry of how we can understand 
rights and the relationship between right and legality. From whence does legality obtain 
its normative coercive bindingness?
SOME PERFUNCTORY MATTERS
A discussion of rights is intrinsically linked to the understanding of law. This is not to 
circumvent the issue. Rather, it is a starting point and we shall came back to the issue of: 
what is right? This is a critical question since man is bom in law, must lead a life governed 
by law and his after life is governed by law. Law is not an invention of the legal theorist. It 
is given and manifests itself as a regime of moral regulation.
Theory's indispensable role is to give an independent and coherent justification to the 
above questions. Any theory that seeks to give a coherent account must as of necessity 
involve principles which can be abstracted from conditions which necessarily influence 
their practical application.1 Abstraction should not be equated with idealization. Rather it 
is simply a process of detaching certain claims from others. Abstract principles are therefore 
relevant for reasoning that has broad scope.
We begin with an allusion as to what it is to give an account. A proper theoretical of anything 
is as of necessity circular. There is something to the old adage; everything is what it is. One 
begins by analyzing phenomena, works through the properties of that phenomena and 
concludes whether the properties harmoniously fit into the whole. In formalist terms, such 
a justificatory enterprise is called the concept of the articulated whole. In as much as law is 
given, you and I as human beings, constitute a world which is made up of thoughts. This 
gives rise to the possibility of law being intelligible on its own account as law, a point that 
has largely been ignored by contemporary legal theorists.
CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE
We begin with an accusation. Rightwing and leftwing legal theorists have consistently 
ascribed right to certain political, cultural and economic systems. Thus today we have the 
subsuming of law under an endless list of other scholarly disciplines as if law is incapable 
of being understood on its own; Law and economics; law and culture; feminism and law, 
law and politics; law and sociology and so on.
This implied holistic approach is supposedly reflective of the democratic nature of 
scholarship in which unrelated scholarly disciplines are understood in terms of each other.2
1 Immanuel Kant, "On the Common Saying: This May Be True In Theory, But Does Not Apply In 
Practise," in Kant's Political Writings, 61 (H. Reiss, e.d. 1970).
2 See Dennis T. Mandudzo, "A Theory of Delict," 1993, Zimbabwe Law Review.
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Such jurisprudential explanations of rights, we shall argue, have been largely responsible 
for unjust policies. O f particu lar poignance is Anglo Saxon u tilita rian  jurisprudence and 
Marxist jurisprudence.
The utilitarian version o f Anglo Saxon jurisprudence has throughout its history given a 
normative foundation of political repression.3 Championing the maximal happiness of the 
greatest number or the more modern approach of "balancing" rights has meant that 
repressive colonial legislation can be legitimised and that tyranny can be justified in the 
interests of economic well being. Who, on this side of the world would doubt the pervasive 
influence that, say, Austinian or Bethamite legal theory has had on colonial and post colonial 
regimes. How else could one explain the extra judicial functions of colonial administrators 
who would with impunity act as judge, prosecutor and executioner. During the colonial 
era, entire tribes could be wiped out in the "interests of civilization."
The Marxist often quoted cry about the withering away of the state and the anarchist 
posturing about what amounts to a utopian hedonistic garden of eden have been proven 
to be a historical falsehood. Cruel totalitarian states whose sole means of survival was an 
omnipotent state while at the same time hypocritically calling for the withering away of 
the state have fallen by the wayside. Today the vast masses of our long suffering peoples 
are being asked to surrender their rights on the basis that rights are culturally alien and 
that rights hinder the furtherance of their material wellbeing. Sadly, such wellbeing has 
not been forthcoming.
With this in mind we must view the law and the syndrome that currently pervade today's 
law books and journals with scepticism. Contemporary rights discourse has tended to be 
all inclusive. Properties that properly belong to the political and economic domain, such 
as gender "development" are now championed on the banner of rights. This is the point of 
departure in this essay. Right, and consequently obligation, which are articulated in law 
and through law can only make sense when viewed without reference to other fields qf 
enquiry as is characteristic of contemporary scholarship. Right and law occupy a separate 
province from scholarly disciplines. Right we shall see, knows no tribe, culture, race, gender 
or economic status but is universal in nature.
The givenness of right makes it an idea of reason, that is, an exhibition of intelligible thought.
It follows that right is a priori. It is not subject to experience. What therefore animates this 
idea of right? The answer lies in man's capacity for free and purposive agency. The 
justification for right therefore lies in the very nature of human action/freedom, an idea to 
which we now turn.
Free will
Free will is free and purposive agency so construed. Purposiveness is the use of freedom 
inherent in choice. Agency has two normative dimensions: (a) The capacity for choice, that 
is the capacity which is given to all rational beings to have an object as a preference. The 
free agent is able to reflect on the content of any particular purpose and at the same time is 
able to abstract and choose one purpose in favour of another, (b) The capacity of the will, 
being the capacity for desire, is as the determining ground of choice. The object must be 
distinguished from the choice. Choice is constitutive of the external manifestation of an
3 This of course does not mean all English legal theorists are utilitarianists. Notable exceptions include 
John Locke and his modem day expositor, the American, John Rawls.
Z imbabwe Law R eview 3
agent's inward purpose. Freedom in the negative sense involves not being determined by 
inclination or impulse, while in the positive sense it denotes the capacity of the will (practical 
reason) to be itself practical. Practical reason refers to anything that is possible in the exercise 
of free and purposive agency, that is the will is free.4
Central to the operation of free will is the role of mental representation. The moral agent is 
able to adopt and discard one choice in favour of another and bring an object of desire into 
reality. This in sum, represents the capacity to abstract and reflect upon the content of 
mental representation. Once an agent makes his choice, he abides by it.5 An agent's action 
is rational in as far as it is not determined by circumstance or inclination arbitrium brutum, 
(animal will), but by the universality inherent in choice as determined by free will (arbitrium 
liberum). An action is moral if it is done under duty. In cases of conflict we can distinguish 
deeds that are right or wrong obligations and desire.6 Purposiveness accordingly connotes 
the use of freedom that is presupposed in choice.7
Correlatively, the freedom which you and I have, and which makes us equal, is not lawless 
hedonism to do what we want at any given moment; a kind of an anarchical empirical 
licence, but rather the capacity at any given moment as rational beings to "transcend the 
immediacy of inclination and thus engage in moral reflection and choice".8The normative 
basis of agency is not empirical, but transcendental, that is, reason as a universal law.
Free will is therefore universal in character; agents pursue their chosen ends whatever 
they may be and wherever they may be situate. Professor Weinrib elucidates;
Practical reason is the determining ground of agency so construed. In as much as only 
a rational being can abstract, agency is rationality as it operates to change the world. 
Particular acts are most expressive of the agent's rationality when they are determined 
not by the givenness of inclination and circumstance, but by the universality inherent 
in the form of choice. At a minimum this universality requires that the principle on 
which a purposive being chooses to act be capable of functioning as a principle valid 
for all purposive beings, whatever their inclinations or circumstances and whatever 
the specific purposes that might promote their well being. In this conception of 
normativeness, particular choices live up to the formal stand point that characterizes 
the purposive activity of free agents. Normativeness is thus the expression of practical 
reason in its most literal sense: as a unity of reason and practice.9
Practical reason is hence synonymous with the unity of agency and the will. The agent's 
capacity to abstract from particular ends leads the possibility of ordering interactions 
between free and purposive agents without making judgement on the virtuousness of their 
chosen purposes.10
Out of the above proposition comes Kant's famous categorical imperative "Act upon a 
maxim that can also hold as a universal law".11 The categorical imperative therefore provides 
a normative stand point for determining right and duty, which concepts are only peculiar
4 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 42-43 (Mary Gregor, trans, 1991).
5 See Ernest J. Weinrib, "Law as Kantian Idea of Reason," 87, Columbia Law Review 481-482 (1987).
6 Immanuel Kant, Kant's Political Writings, 18 (Hans Reiss, trans. 1970).
7 Encrst J. Weinrib, 'The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism," p 12-13.
8 Owen Fiss, "CODA," 38 University of Toronto Law Journal 229, 234 (1988).
9 Enerst J. Weinrib, "The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism", AALS Meetings Paper, 13, (1992).
10 Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law.
11 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p 51.
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to human beings. Conduct stemming from animal will is not normatively basic. Right 
therefore involves drawing out the juridical implications of willing, as the externalisation 
of the agent's inward purpose.12 Put differently, right is constitutive of the sum total of 
norms under which my choice can be conjoined with that of another in accordance with a 
universal principle of freedom. As such, it is reflective of free and purposive agency. Thus 
the gravamen behind the idea of right is the harmonization of wills that are free.
The idea of right therefore excludes wishing whether benevolent or malevolent and with 
it, wellbeing. A wish is practical in as far as it involves mental representation and can thus 
be discarded in favour of another but it has no external effect.13 In the same vein, need, 
which is internal to one agent, has no bilateral external existence and as such cannot legally 
oblige another, except ethically. The harmonisation of free wills is not concerned with the 
specific purpose of the agent because what motivates him remains internal to him. My 
right cannot be harmonised by my choice to another's need/wish but by my choice and 
another's choice alone.
Choice, not the content of choice is the relevant signpost. Thus for example, the law of 
contract is not concerned with the motivating factors inducing the contract, but rather 
with the judicial meeting of the minds, that is, the formal meeting of the wills of abstractly 
equal parties. Freedom therefore manifests itself juridically in rights others are morally 
bound not to violate. The conception of men without personality is normatively impossible. 
A fortiori, agents are bom with inert right, which refers the right to one's own humanity as 
a self determining autonomous agent, through which we can extrapolate the rights that 
can determine what is mine or yours.
The scheme outlined above which articulates and brackets right as the juridical 
manifestation of free will does not accommodate welfare. Now, we must at this point 
emphasise that we are not denying the significance of welfare. An agent, as a free being, 
exercises his free will in a given environment. Purposive agency takes place under empirical 
conditions, which may include "the working of one's will through the physical organism 
of the body, the sentience of the organism, the presence of satisfactions that motivate action 
and so on."14 The point is that welfare is not normatively basic as it is political. Welfare is 
only relevant in so far as it is crystallised in the holding of a right, that is, it is secondary to 
the idea of right. Right is not concerned with whether an act increases or decreases welfare, 
but with whether an act is harmonious with the choice of another in accordance with 
practical reason.
While the activity of acquiring or enhancing or using one's property is driven by one's 
needs and interests, the idea of property derives from abstract right rather than from 
welfare.15 Welfare is political in the sense that it deals with the amelioration of conditions 
that adversely affect the agent's well being and not with how the agent exercises his freedom. 
This accords the priority of right over good a normative significance. Rights are an end in 
themselves, while welfare is a means to an end. Juridically, there is no obligation to satisfy 
another's want.
The sphere of right is distinct from ethics because law is concerned with the legality of 
concrete human action, not the moral intention of the agent. Ethics are only relevant in as
12 Ernest J. Weinrib, "Corrective Justice", 77 Iowa Law Review 422-423 (1992).
13 Weinrib, "Law as A Kantian Idea of Reason", p 479.
14 Weinrib, "The Jurisprudence of Legal Formalism" p 15.
15 Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law p.172 - 173.
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far as law allows the agent to satisfy his inner moral fulfilment. If we were to start with 
welfare or experience, we would never get the correct sense of obligation. One can 
understand right without reference to virtue, but never vice versa. Since right is an end 
that is owed to persons as persons, it cannot be contingent upon another's subjective 
predilection. [To equate right with the good would amount to a coincidence of Panglosian 
proportions].
We have seen how the striking feature of right is its normativity; the agent's particular 
aspects such as character and overall situation are irrelevant. The virtuousness or wishes 
of the parties are irrelevant to the bindingness of a legal obligation. Put simply, right is the 
moral capacity for putting obligations on others. Right is therefore intertwined with the 
need to use coercion, that is, to conform with the choice of others.
THE GENERAL WILL AND WHAT IS YOURS OR MINE
Recall and consider here that free agency gives the moral basis for private property; the 
latter being a juridical reflex of the former. Anything that is incapable of free agency is 
subject to acquisition in accordance and in conformity with the idea of right. The possibility 
of right coheres with the principle of property. There is a contrast between freedom and 
objects that are not free. It follows there is nothing in the principle of universal right to 
prevent the requisition and usage of things that are not free.
To conclusively establish what is mine or yours we require conditions that secure right. 
Public right or the general will is therefore a derivative of free will in the sense that right 
obtains to the external interactions of wills that are free. Practical reason therefore becomes 
the general/universal will.16 The general will is therefore practical reason as it functions in 
conformity to the idea of right by coercing wills that are free into lawful freedom. Taken on 
its own, coercion is a hinderance to freedom, but its use is consistent with freedom when it 
is deployed to prevent hinderance to freedom.17
Without the general will, the rights that you and I have can only be provisional. While a 
state of nature is not necessarily a state of injustice, it is a state devoid of justice because 
when our rights are in dispute there is no competent authority to render an impartial binding 
verdict.18 The state therefore is the final conclusion of the idea of right; it is the ultimate 
expression of the freedom so called. With its establishment, you and I move from lawless 
freedom into a regime of reciprocal coerced lawful freedom.
Contrary to arnachist and Marxist arguments which view the state as an unnecessary evil 
or as immoral, the state is central to the idea of freedom, beginning with freedom's 
embryonic state in free will to its maturation in a normative regime of public law. Because 
we are all born with inert right, there is a moral duty for us to enter into a lawful state, 
otherwise one will be forced to enter into freedom, it being an idea of practical reason. You 
can only be free in so far as your freedom does not impinge on that of other moral actors.
It will be recalled that private right is the restriction of an agent's freedom so that it conforms 
with the freedom of other actors. Public right, that is, the state, makes this constant 
harmonious relationship possible. Accordingly the civil state is a relationship among free 
and equal persons who are subjected to coercive laws, while at the same time retaining
16 See Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law p 133.
17 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals p 57.
18 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p 123.
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their freedom in relation to others. Such a requirement is an a priori postulated of pure 
reason. The civil state is based on three principles:
a) The freedom of everyone in society as a moral person.
b) The equality of all moral persons.
c) The autonomy of every individual as a citizen.19
The equality spoken of is not equality of possessions or intellect, but equality before the 
law. Conceived from the stand point of right, the state should not be perceived as a narrow 
defence of private interests, but rather as the supreme goal of universal justice. A state that 
secures right is not based on logic or experience but on universal reason as an a priori 
principle. We enter into the state in order to receive our freedom secure and undiminished. 
Accordingly the function of a rightful state is not the defense of narrow class interests, but 
to secure everyone's freedom. Under the doctrine of right, everyone is treated equally 
irrespective of one's station in life; the shanty town dweller or the captain of industry.
We have seen that the general will is the rational and absolute resolve of wills that are free. 
There must be obedience to coercive laws that guarantee the freedom you and I have and 
what is mine or yours. The next issue to be addressed is; from whence does the general 
will obtain its practical aspect i.e. how do we move from the state of nature to a lawful 
state? The answer lies in the hypothetical postulate of the original contract.
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT
What is it that makes men enter into freedom? Reason as a universal transcendental 
principle! The original contract is a contract of a unique nature. It is introduced in order to 
provide rational account of how people move from provisional enjoyment of rights into a 
lawful civil society under which what is mine or yours is securely protected.
Public reason is what allows the conception and postulation of original position. Unlike 
the Rawlsian conception,20 the parties to the original contract need not be under a veil of 
ignorance. The veil of ignorance is a restatement of the obvious and may well be suited to 
a political conception of justice, rather than a metaphysical understanding of how we enter 
into a rightful state.
Public reason has no dictatorial authority, its resolution is simply an agreement of free 
beings.21 In contradistinction, private reason is what avails an agent when he is under a 
relation of command and obedience, for example, a soldier, or while in the pursuit of self 
interest.22 Public reason, or in simpler terms, intellectual freedom, is the key to the 
understanding of right, because right, as a construct of thought, cannot be experienced 
before it is thought out. Public reason therefore connotes discussion without external 
coercion. Conceived from the standpoint of public reason, the original position becomes 
the only matrix within which a plurality of potentially reasoning beings can constitute the
19 Kank , “On the Common Saying," p 73-74.
20 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Belkap Press, 1971 and John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia 
University Press, 1993.
21 See Onora O'Neill, "Vindicating Reason," in Paul Gruyer (ed) The Cambridge Companion to Kant, 1992 
at p 291-293.
22 For a discussion of the distinction between public and private reason see D. T. Mandudzo; 'The 
Philosophy of Public Reason" (9-10), Zimbabwe Law Review, p 53-55 (1991-1992) Vol. 9.
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full authority of reason and so be able to debate without internal restrictions as to what a 
just civil constitution ought to be.23
The original position/contract is not an assembly of persons actual or possible which would 
reduce the contract to a heuristic device. Nor is it an aggregation of free wills since self 
interest would cloud the debate on how we enter into freedom. Nor do persons enter into 
it because of men's warlike or savage nature, that is, it must not be coerced. It does not 
arise out of the necessity to contain passion/revenge. The original contract is not a fact of 
history, so that the principles derived therefrom are not subject to historical empirical proof 
of its existence or an investigation of how persons enter into a lawful state.
The original contract is merely a construction of reason. Qua reason the original position is 
a contract between free selves. Despite being hypothetical, and to that extent it cannot 
bind, as an idea of reason par excellence, the original position obtains a normative 
significance. It has undoubted practical reality in that it "obliges every legislator to frame 
his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole 
nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented 
within the general will."24
So seen, the original position becomes a representation of the realisation of freedom that 
all rational persons strive for. This is why law and the state are non historical. If we were to 
imagine for a moment that there was no state and law and enter into a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance we would still come up with law and the state as postulates of the original 
position. It therefore becomes a kind of a categorical imperative; if you want to secure 
lawful freedom, enter into the original position. In short, in the original position man enters 
into freedom so construed. Under the original position, lawful freedom becomes the 
attribute of obeying no laws other than those to which an agent has given his consent 
under the general will; civil equality is equal treatment before the law for all citizens despite 
their differences in wealth, moral or social standing; civil independence being the right to 
be one's own person and not be to be under the choice of others. Under the original position 
individuals can pursue their own brand of happiness, so long as those pursuits do not 
violate the freedom of others.25 The subjection to a lawful regime coheres with the affirmation 
of one's status as a free being.
PRACTICALITY OF RIGHT AS AN IDEA OF REASON
Free will has explained why plant and animal species such as dogs and trees for example 
cannot have rights outside those that man chooses to give them. Only man has free will 
and is thus capable of acting in accordance with rational principles. This does not mean 
that he always does so, for this would render the idea of right irrelevant. We have concepts 
like duty and obligation because it is man alone who can be obliged by the categorical 
imperative.
The volition of the idea of right as an aspect of free will brings the idea adjudication into 
high relief. The maturation of free will into public law yields to an impartial arbiter of 
rights; the court. As the exemplar of practical reason the court assumes a non political 
character in its determination of right which is presupposed in free will. The actor's wrong
23 See Onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy, 1989, at 
p 208-209.
24 See E.J Weinrib, "Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason," p 479 quoting Kant.
25 See Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p 125.
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is not directed to the world at large but to a particular plaintiff. Since neither of the agents 
has the right to unilaterally determine between two conflicting wills, recourse is had to a 
third party who is external to both.
As such, the arbitrator's role consists of rendering public the categories of property, contract 
and wrong which are implied by the concept of right. In so doing, these principles must be 
openly declared and publicity acknowledged i.e. the court does not only interpret the 
interaction of free wills but makes public such interaction. The role of public law is not 
only coercive but interpretive, prospective and deterrent. "Since the vindication of right 
includes the prevention or reversal of violations of right, the freedom of all is immediately 
joined with a reciprocal universal coercion".26
As justice ensouled the role of the judge is simply to determine the rights of the parties and 
not social considerations. The court's role is simply to actualise right in public law. The 
external nature of right makes it necessary that law be certain and determinate. Extraneous 
factors such as loss spreading and welfare are ignored because they introduce indeterminacy 
and as we have seen rights refer to determinate ends and not means to an end. The eminent 
Kantian Legal scholar, Professor, Weinrib, elegantly posits that;
political authority is a conceptional necessity based upon the interaction of free wills.
Since right is the foundation and not the reflection of political legitimacy, the ground 
of law is not located in the state but in the relationship of free beings determinable by 
practical reason27
CONCLUSION
It is not from politics or economics that you and I obtain our rights, but rather from the 
rationality inherent and presupposed in free choice. We have seen how right gives law its 
normative force. Right is the marrow of legality so to speak. As Kant long noted, without 
the concept of right, law would be dull and brainless; it would lack internal intelligibility.28 
Right therefore is the signpost that animates juridical relationships. This obviously goes 
above the brooding coercive emptiness of positivism and the pain of utilitarianism.
In what has been aptly described as an unjustly neglected article, Michael Oakeshott, over 
half a century ago, observed the confusion that pervaded legal scholarship. Having 
examined the competing claims of historical, political and economic legal theorists, he 
pointed out that philosophical jurisprudence could not simply accede to the conclusions 
of special disciplines. Rather, it must state what we already know about law and then 
work backwards through those presuppositions of this knowledge in order to gain a fuller 
understanding. It would appear that the passage of time has failed to diminish the pertinence 
of his observations. The variegation of contemporary legal scholarship is not surprising. 
Faced with a social world of acute disparities in wealth and competing ideologies on the 
amelioration of poverty, legal scholarship has succumbed to the demands of political 
ideologies. If we are to conquer unjust polity, it is imperative that legal scholarship retains 
its erstwhile philosophical inquiry.
In contradistinction to the various legal schools which treat Kantianism pejoratively or 
with outright hostility, Kantianism treats right as right and thereby asserts its normative
26 See E. J. Weinrib," Law as Kantian Idea of Reason" p 498, and generally at pp 496-500 on the role of 
adjudication.
27 Ibid., at p 508.
28 See E. J. Weinrib, Ibid, at p 472.
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significance to individual freedoms. By this short contribution you and I have attempted 
to restate and elucidate the normative foundation of right as understood by Kant and 
consequently what determines what is mine or yours. Idea of reason is what characterises 
the Kantian treatment of right.
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